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Abstract: this paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the determinants of aid 
effort by donor countries, a topic that has been rather under-researched in the vast economic 
literature on development aid. We conduct an econometric analysis on panel data that refer to 
the 22 member countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee over the 1970-2004 
period; the estimates are then used as a benchmark against which we assess to what extent 
the poor Italian aid performance can be traced back to its specific macroeconomic, structural 
and institutional characteristics. The analysis suggests that these factors – that are found to 
significantly influence aid effort – fall short of explaining the limited amount of fiscal resources 
that Italy devotes to international aid. Even when its specific characteristics are accounted for, 
Italy is found to be lagging behind the OECD norm, so that the analysis challenges the claims 
that the limited Italian aid effort is due to binding fiscal constraints. 
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1. THE ROLE OF AID IN PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
 
The last twenty-five years have witnessed unprecedented economic changes that have 
markedly affected both the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ of international aid
3. To start 
with, the ‘demand for aid’ (and for commercial loans provided by the International 
Financial Institutions) was curtailed by the rapid growth recorded in the countries of 
East, South East and part of South Asia, i.e. countries that in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s were major recipients of international aid. Such countries have now emerged as 
global growth engines, major partners in international trade, a destination of choice 
for foreign direct investments (FDI), a main source of unskilled and skilled migrants 
and, in the case of China, an increasingly important provider of foreign aid to Africa 
and other low income countries. While still sizeable, poverty declined and continues 
declining rapidly in these countries while their aid dependence has fallen sharply, with 
the exception of a few least developed countries such as Bangladesh, Kampuchea and 
Nepal. In most of South America, the election of progressive governments has led to 
the re-examination of these countries’ dependence on multilateral/bilateral loans and 
grants characterized by strong policy conditionality, with the results that the financing 
of  their  imports  and  debt  servicing  is  now  covered  by  FDI,  migrant  remittances, 
exports  and  –  when  necessary  –  the  recourse  to  an  ever  expanding  international 
capital market. The situation is somewhat different in the smaller and poorer countries 
of Central America, but in this region too the financing of imports is increasingly being 
ensured by a steady flow of migrant remittances. In these countries, as well as in the 
European economies in transition and the middle income economies of Middle East 
and  North  Africa,  foreign  aid  is  increasingly  being  sought  more  for  the  ‘technical 
assistance’ it brings with it and its role in ‘leveraging domestic resources’ rather than 
a way to fill a ‘resource gap’. The situation is obviously different in Sub-Saharan Africa 
where aid demand remains very high, including for ‘general budgetary support’ and 
‘balance  of  payments  assistance’.  For  instance,  in  Niger  foreign  aid  represented  in 
2005 no less than 8 percent of GDP and about 40 percent of government revenue. 
While some growth was recorded since 2000 also in this region, and while the regional 
balance  of  payments  improved  thanks  to  the  recent  rise  of  commodity  prices  and 
slowly  mounting  migrant  remittances,  the  imbalance  between  domestic  needs  and 
                                                 
3  In  what  follows,  the  terms  ‘aid’,  ‘official  aid’,  ‘international  aid’  and  ‘foreign  aid’  are  used 
interchangeably with that of Official Development Assistance, that is defined as the public aid outflows 
with a grant element of at least 25 percent. aimed primarily at promoting the economic development and 
human welfare of recipient countries.   3 
resources remains and will remain substantial, making the recourse to international 
aid unavoidable. 
The  ‘supply  of  aid’  has  also  been  affected  by  recent  economic  and  technological 
changes. On the one side, the Western civil society is now better informed than before 
about  the  survival  needs  of  the  poorest  people  and  nations  thanks  to  the 
intensification of migration, tourist flows and global media reporting. Such improved 
awareness raises the pressure on Western governments to increase the ‘supply of aid’ 
for altruistic reasons. At the same time, with continued growth in trade, outsourcing, 
FDI and migration, many developed countries now attach to foreign aid a supportive – 
or at least a complementary – role in the pursuit of their commercial, investment and 
strategic objectives. Moreover, the Western governments now argue that aid levels 
have to be set taking into account also the ‘concessions’ made in the field of trade 
openness, foreign investments, migrant quotas and so on. In this regard, the trends 
in key international financial transactions confirm the declining importance of official 
aid to developing countries and the steady rise of FDI and official remittances. Official 
remittances, which fail to count relevant informal transfers, were estimated at $200 
billion in 2006 and have therefore become the main source of development finance for 
many Third World countries. Finally, globalization may have decreased the ‘supply of 
aid’  to  former  colonies,  while  low  (real  or  perceived)  ‘aid  effectiveness’  may  have 
reduced popular support for additional aid and increased the sense of aid fatigue.  
These arguments, however, conceal more than they reveal. In fact, the distribution of 
international financial flows is skewed in favor of the emerging economies, and at the 
expense  of  the  poorest  ones.  For  instance,  in  2006  only  $7  billion  of  official 
remittances were received by Sub-Saharan Africa, by far the poorest region on earth, 
while  $45  billion  went  to  East  Asia,  36  to  South  Asia,  53  to  Latin  America,  25  to 
Middle East and North Africa and 32 to the European and Central Asian economies in 
transition (World Bank, 2006a). An even more lopsided pattern is observed for the 
regional distribution of FDI, most of which benefit China, the OECD, and a few other 
East Asian countries. 
While  the  surge  in  migration  and  commodity  prices  and  the  expansion  of  financial 
markets tend to depress both the demand and supply of foreign aid as a ‘gap filler’, a 
new rationale for providing aid to poor countries is gradually emerging. This has to do 
with the financing through a few new Global Funds of activities which prevent or offset 
the  effects  of  global  negative  externalities  such  as  environmental  contamination, 
SARS,  AIDS,  international  criminal  networks,  and  other  infectious  diseases  that  –   4 
while  potentially  more  harmful  in  the  poorest  countries  –  affect  the  developed 
countries as well. 
Thus,  while  aid  supply  and  aid  demand  have  changed  substantially  over  the  last 
twenty  years,  and  while  the  promotion  of  development  in  parts  of  the  developing 
world should now be pursued mainly through non traditional instruments, for the 1.5 
billion people located in Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of South and South-East Asia and 
Central America, international aid will remain for the next two generations a key tool 
for  generating  badly  needed  resources,  alleviating  poverty,  reducing  hunger  and 
promoting growth. Consequently, while its rationale has partly changed, the demand 
for and the developmental role of aid remain high, as reiterated by the UN-sponsored 
Monterrey  Conference  on  Development  Financing,  the  UN  Millennium  Development 
Assembly of 2000, and the 2002 EU-sponsored Barcelona Conference that set for its 
members  a  minimum  aid  target  of  0.33  percent  of  GNI,  with  the  perspective  of 
reaching a minimum of 0.39 percent in 2006. 
However, such new target-setting has been accompanied by limited fulfillment of old 
and new aid obligations. The long-standing UN target of 0.7 percent of GDP continues 
to  be  unmet  by  most  members  of  the  Development  Assistance  Committee,
 4 DAC 
henceforth, while even less ambitious targets – such as the Barcelona’s one – remain 
unachieved by several donor countries (Table 1). 
Not all is negative, however, and some countries have improved both the quantity and 
quality of their foreign aid during the last six years. For instance, the United Kingdom 
has raised the volume of its aid flows, and radically overhauled its aid agency. Similar 
reforms  were  carried  out  recently  in  Spain.  Aid  policy  is  also  becoming  more 
consistent with the stated objective of fighting poverty and deprivation. And the DAC 
objective of aid untying is increasingly being fulfilled in many countries (see later). All 
this,  however,  has  not  happened  in  Italy,  where  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
international aid remains unsatisfactory. This issue is explored in the next sections.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The Development Assistance Committee is the principal body of the OECD that deals with the issue of 
co-operation  with  developing  countries.  At  present,  the  DAC  includes  22  countries  plus  the  European 
Union.   5 











Australia  0.43  0.38  0.29  0.24 
Austria  0.17  0.24  0.31  0.34 
Belgium  0.53  0.49  0.40  0.49 
Canada  0.46  0.44  0.39  0.26 
Denmark  0.55  0.78  1.02  1.02 
Finland  0.16  0.43  0.48  0.39 
France  0.41  0.54  0.56  0.48 
Germany  0.33  0.39  0.41  0.31 
Greece  n.a.  n.a.  0.07  0.22 
Ireland
  0.09  0.17  0.22  0.32 
Italy  0.10  0.31  0.25  0.19 
Japan  0.23  0.30  0.27  0.23 
Luxembourg  n.a.  0.17  0.46  0.74 
Netherlands  0.71  0.93  0.83  0.84 
New Zealand  0.31  0.25  0.22  0.21 
Norway  0.61  0.92  0.94  0.88 
Portugal  n.a.  0.09  0.27  0.37 
Spain  n.a.  0.09  0.24  0.24 
Sweden  0.71  0.82  0.82  0.83 
Switzerland  0.18  0.29  0.39  0.41 
United Kingdom  0.43  0.33  0.31  0.37 
United States  0.24  0.21  0.16  0.15 
Average  0.37  0.41  0.42  0.43 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data 
 
 
2. AID CONCEPTS 
 
Most studies of international aid focus either on its impact, its allocation among poor 
countries and sectors, or the domestic policies needed to enhance its effectiveness 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000). As for aid allocation, the dominant view is that selectivity 
is  the  most  effective  way  to  improve  the  developmental  impact  of  aid,  and  that 
assistance  should  be  granted  only  to  countries  that  already  have  in  place  sound 
policies.  The  alternative  would  be  to  make  the  granting  of  aid  conditional  to  the 
implementation of adequate policies. Aid selectivity has been supported by Easterly 
(2001), and Collier and Dollar (2002). A second stream of the literature assesses the 
extent to which aid is determined by ‘altruistic’ or ‘strategic’ considerations. Alesina 
and  Dollar  (2002)  show  that  aid  allocations  are  driven  by  strategic  considerations 
(such  as  political  orientation,  colonial  past,  and  voting  pattern  in  the  UN  General 
Assembly). Marchesi and Missale (2004) find that the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPCs) receive aid precisely because of their high indebtedness, as donors rely on 
foreign  aid  as  a  defensive  instrument  to  reduce  the  risk  of  default  of  recipient 
countries; finally, prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, aid effort and – to a lesser extent   6 
– allocation choices by DAC countries were influenced by the military expenditure of 
the Warsaw Pact countries (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007).  
A third family of analyses focuses on the determinants of the ‘supply of aid’ (or ‘aid 
effort’) in donor countries. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have dealt 
with this topic. Round and Odedokun (2004) examine the determinants of ‘aid supply’ 
over  1970-2000,  and  find  that  this  is  favorably  affected  by  per  capita  GDP  of  the 
donor  countries,  peer  pressure  (i.e.  the  aid  commitments  of  other  donors),  and 
government and military expenditures. Faini (2006) tests a model with fewer variables 
over 1980-2000, and finds a negative impact of the budget deficit and public debt on 
the aid to GDP ratio, suggesting that over the long term expansionary fiscal policies 
hamper rather than increase aid flows. 
Our study belongs to the latter research stream. Hereafter, the main concepts of ‘aid 
supply’ are reviewed together with its main determinants. In its simplest form, ‘aid 
supply’ can be defined as the aid to GDP ratio. A first dilemma arises immediately: 
should aid be considered on a commitment or net disbursement basis? Much depends, 
of course, on the extent of the ‘arrears’ and the delays with which aid commitments 
are disbursed. In this regard, Table 2 shows that – even in the most recent period – 
arrears, defined as the difference between commitments and actual disbursements, 
can account for well over ten percent of commitments. Interestingly, countries with a 
high level of aid over GDP (the Scandinavian and the Netherlands) as well as those 
that  increased  aid  effort  since  the  early  2000s  (such  as  the  UK  and  Luxembourg) 
reported low or negative arrears, while countries with low-medium aid to GDP ratios 
such  as  Italy,  Germany  and  Japan  exhibit  considerable  arrears.  As  there  can  be 
considerable differences between commitments and disbursements, it is safer to adopt 
aid on a net disbursement basis as the relevant concept of ‘aid effort’. In this regard, 
during the entire period (1970-2004) Italian disbursements have never been in line 
with commitments. This is a negative record shared with Germany, Japan, the United 
States, and, to a lesser extent, Canada.   7 
  
 











Australia  5.3  3.8  2.9  1.4 
Austria  14.8  22.9  23.5  -0.5 
Belgium  20.8  0.1  -5.0  2.8 
Canada  21.6  16.2  2.1  12.1 
Denmark  18.5  6.5  -5.2  0.2 
Finland  26.2  19.3  -1.1  12.5 
France  45.0  15.5  0.7  15.5 
Germany  31.4  24.4  6.4  19.1 
Greece  n.a.  n.a.  -0.3  0.2 
Ireland  0.0  0.0  -5.6  -0.1 
Italy  35.7  37.6  6.5  15.9 
Japan  33.2  24.2  32.0  33.9 
Luxembourg  n.a.  n.a.  -4.0  -1.8 
Netherlands  23.8  8.2  -1.2  -5.3 
New Zealand  6.2  -4.5  -1.9  7.6 
Norway  12.9  -4.5  -12.3  -1.1 
Portugal  n.a.  41.8  -34.6  5.9 
Spain  n.a.  n.a.  -0.3  9.7 
Sweden  17.1  -6.8  -1.0  -10.7 
Switzerland  19.8  8.3  -0.8  2.7 
United Kingdom  20.6  10.8  0.6  2.7 
United States  22.3  9.1  17.3  20.7 
Average  20.8  12.3  0.8  6.5 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data 
 
 











Australia  0.43  0.38  0.29  0.24 
Austria  0.17  0.24  0.30  0.29 
Belgium  0.53  0.49  0.38  0.40 
Canada  0.46  0.44  0.37  0.25 
Denmark  0.52  0.75  1.00  1.02 
Finland  0.14  0.42  0.46  0.39 
France  0.40  0.53  0.48  0.41 
Germany  0.32  0.37  0.39  0.28 
Greece  n.a.  n.a.  0.07  0.22 
Ireland  0.09  0.17  0.22  0.32 
Italy  0.10  0.30  0.24  0.16 
Japan  0.23  0.30  0.26  0.22 
Luxembourg  n.a.  0.17  0.46  0.74 
Netherlands  0.66  0.91  0.79  0.79 
New Zealand  0.31  0.25  0.22  0.21 
Norway  0.61  0.92  0.92  0.88 
Portugal  n.a.  0.09  0.24  0.34 
Spain  n.a.  0.09  0.23  0.22 
Sweden  0.67  00.81  0.82  0.82 
Switzerland  0.16  0.29  0.37  0.41 
United Kingdom  0.42  0.32  0.30  0.35 
United States  0.24  0.21  0.15  0.15 
Average  0.36  0.40  0.41  0.41 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data 
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An even more precise measure of aid effort is given by aid disbursements net of debt 
cancellations over GDP, which measures the true outflow of development finance to 
developing countries, as most or all of the debt cancelled had not been serviced for 
years and basically had no real value. As shown in Table 3, in most donors countries 
this  more  accurate  measure  of  aid  is  much  lower  than  that  reported  in  Table  1, 
particularly  for  the  last  15  years.  The  reduction  in  the  aid  to  GDP  due  to  the 
subtraction  of  debt  relief  is  particularly  prominent  for  European  countries  such  as 
Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy. During 2000-4, the Italian aid effort net of debt 
forgiveness  was  a  puny  0.16  percent  of  GDP,  and  only  the  US  recorded  a  worst 
performance. 
The intrinsic value of aid and its global development impact depend also on the share 
allocated  to  low  income  developing  countries  (i.e.  countries  where  resources  are 
scarce and poverty widespread) in relation to the share allocated to middle income 
developing countries. In the first case developmental and humanitarian objectives are 
likely to dominate, entailing that the impact of aid could a priori be the greatest, while 
in the latter case strategic and commercial considerations may prevail, as suggested, 
for instance, by the allocation of a large part of the US aid to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. 
In  addition,  as  the  current  debate  on  policy  coherence  suggests,  in  middle-income 
countries the goals of combating poverty, reducing inequality, guaranteeing access to 
global commons, protecting the environment, etc., can be achieved through FDI and 
trade  concessions.  In  contrast,  aid  remains  fundamental  in  low-income  countries 
where there is little scope for commercial opportunities. In this regard, it is interesting 
to  note  that  in  many  DAC  countries  aid  to  low-income  countries  represents  at  the 
moment only little more than half the total aid allocations (Table 4). On average, over 
the last 15 years, aid to low-income developing countries has been 0.23 percent of 
GDP,  as  against  0.40  percent  for  the  total.  The  decline  of  the  share  of  total  aid 
directed to the low income developing countries since 1990 is partly explained by the 
fall of the communist regimes and the transition crisis, which entailed a redirection of 
aid flows to the Eastern European and former Soviet countries. 
As a result, aid to medium income developing countries rose from below 20 percent of 
the total during the pre-1990 period to 30 percent in the 1990-99 period, to decrease 
to 27.3 percent after 2000. At the same time, there was an increase in aid that was 
allocated to the so-called more-advanced countries and territories, i.e. countries with 
a GNI per capita higher than $9,360, or that was assigned to the new global programs 
mentioned above.   9 
 











Australia  84.2  73.5  64.3  62.9 
Austria  56.1  40.9  33.2  34.8 
Belgium  81.0  72.3  49.1  52.7 
Canada  75.9  64.8  49.1  46.4 
Denmark  83.0  83.8  66.1  61.2 
Finland  88.8  79.4  57.5  47.7 
France  9.1  52.3  44.5  38.8 
Germany  58.7  56.7  37.7  44.2 
Greece  n.a.  n.a.  30.0  22.4 
Ireland  79.2  73.9  60.6  66.7 
Italy  78.7  72.1  49.2  50.0 
Japan  51.3  53.8  46.6  54.5 
Luxembourg  n.a.  62.7  53.4  55.8 
Netherlands  58.6  63.4  50.4  51.0 
New Zealand  37.7  35.3  45.2  56.0 
Norway  87.9  80.8  64.7  59.1 
Portugal  n.a.  56.2  73.6  73.1 
Spain  n.a.  40.7  30.6  38.9 
Sweden  83.6  75.4  56.6  48.8 
Switzerland  77.2  66.6  55.1  49.5 
United Kingdom  73.7  70.3  52.4  53.2 
United States  52.2  41.1  34.8  37.3 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data 
 











Australia  45.8  39.3  12.3  -68.7 
Austria  94.5  42.4  26.1  -38.6 
Belgium  63.9  50.9  4.2  -91.7 
Canada  63.9  46.4  35.7  -23.1 
Denmark  34.8  26.4  13.2  -50.0 
Finland  42.6  35.1  7.8  -77.8 
France  54.9  39.4  9.9  -74.7 
Germany  37.1  34.2  4.9  -85.7 
Greece  n.a.  66.4  46.9  -29.3 
Ireland  29.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy  68.8  54.5  50.6  -7.1 
Japan  42.2  10.7  8.9  -17.2 
Luxembourg  n.a.  10.0  1.9  -80.8 
Netherlands  45.3  21.1  7.1  -66.3 
New Zealand  46.6  n.a.  11.6  n.a. 
Norway  28.8  15.1  0.7  -95.4 
Portugal  n.a.  18.5  7.1  -61.6 
Spain  n.a.  51.4  31.1  -39.4 
Sweden  23.7  15.1  6.6  -56.3 
Switzerland  32.9  13.8  3.6  -74.0 
United 
Kingdom  73.0  35.8  3.0  -91.6 
United States  60.9  41.5  n.a.  n.a. 
Average  49.4  33.4  14.7  -56.1 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data   10 
 
Another factor contributing to aid effectiveness is the degree to which bilateral aid is 
tied, untied, or partially tied. Indeed, several studies have shown that aid tying can 
strongly  reduce  its  development  impact  (see  Jepma,  1991  for  a  review  of  the 
literature on this topic). In this regard, during the last five years there was a general 
reduction in aid tying following the 2001 commitment of DAC countries in this respect. 
But also in this area, Italy recorded the worst performance (Table 5). Indeed, over 
2000-04 about 50 percent of  its bilateral aid was still tied or partially  tied, with  a 
reduction of only 7 percent with respect to its 1990-99 level, while Belgium, Norway, 
and the UK managed to reduce the share of tied and partially tied aid by more than 
90 percent. 
Another  important  aspect  of  ‘aid  supply’  concerns  its  predictability,  as  national 
authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in charge of program delivery 
in developing countries can safely plan service expansion, certain they can count for 
several  years  on  a  steady  flow  of  resources.  Volatile  aid  flows,  in  contrast,  may 
damage the recipient economies due to boom-bust aid and program delivery cycles 
and  aid-induced  Dutch  Disease  problems  (Prati  and  Tressel,  2006).  We  define  aid 
volatility in year t as the coefficient of variation, CVt, of aid over GDP over a three-
years window.
5 This indicator is superior to the standard deviation of aid and to the 
coefficient  of  variation  of  aid  around  the  sample  mean.  According  to  the  measure 
proposed, a steady increase in aid to GDP ratio does not raise unpredictability in the 
receiving countries (which would count on a steady increase in aid flows), though this 
would be the case if the other two measures were used. According to this indicator, 
the countries with the most predictable aid are Denmark, France, the Netherlands, 
and Canada, while those with the least predictable aid are Portugal, Austria, Spain, 
and Italy (Table 6). 
 
                                                 
5 Formally, for each year t, we calculated  ( )
= - = -
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Table 6. Aid volatility: average coefficient of variation around a three-years mobile average 
 









Australia  0.13  0.11  0.05  0.03  0.08 
Austria  0.21  0.20  0.13  0.11  0.17 
Belgium  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.08 
Canada  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.06 
Denmark  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.05 
Finland  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.03  0.09 
France  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Germany  0.07  0.04  0.09  0.02  0.06 
Greece  n.a.  n.a.  0.04  0.11  0.06 
Ireland  0.21  0.13  0.10  0.07  0.14 
Italy  0.20  0.16  0.15  0.06  0.15 
Japan  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Luxembourg  n.a.  0.12  0.11  0.05  0.10 
Netherlands  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.05 
New Zealand  0.13  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.07 
Norway  0.11  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.07 
Portugal  n.a.  0.32  0.12  0.12  0.20 
Spain  n.a.  0.24  0.11  0.09  0.16 
Sweden  0.10  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.07 
Switzerland  0.13  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.08 
United Kingdom  0.06  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.06 
United States  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.06  0.10 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data 
 
 
3. DETERMINANTS OF AID EFFORT: A REVIEW OF COMPETING THEORIES  
 
What factors explain aid effort from a theoretical perspective? The following five families of 
variables can be retained:  
 
3.1. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DONOR COUNTRIES  
Aid over GDP tends to increase in line with per capita GDP (aid would therefore be a ‘superior 
good’ the demand of which rises in parallel with income per capita) and with the share of GDP 
assigned  to  domestic  tax-funded  social  transfers,  a  proxy  of  domestic  solidarity  that  may 
influence the attitude towards international redistribution. In contrast, the aid to GDP ratio is 
expected to decline when income inequality rises, as less egalitarian societies may have a low 
preference for equity, and be therefore unwilling to redistribute nationally and internationally a 
sizeable  share  of  their  GDP  (Mosley,  1985).  Schweinberger  and  Lahiri  (2006)  offer  an 
alternative theoretical explanation of the inverse relationship between income inequality and 
the  public  provision  of  foreign  aid.  In  their  model,  the  levels  of  private  and  official  aid 
represent the outcome of a simultaneous game played between the government and the donor 
households, in which a more unequal income distribution determines a reduction in public aid 
effort that is only partly compensated by an increase in private aid.    12 
In addition, as suggested in Round and Odedokun (2004), the aid to GDP ratio may fall when 
the size of the population of the donor country rises as there might be ‘economies of scale’ in 
aid giving. A first argument in support of such hypothesis is that the effectiveness of $2 billion 
of aid provided by a single donor is greater than that of two $1 billion grants provided by two 
different donors, as administrative, transaction and coordination costs may be lower in the first 
case. A second argument is that an increase in population size is likely to be associated with 
greater  population  heterogeneity,  loss  of  social  cohesion  and  –  ceteris  paribus  –  declining 
willingness to redistribute. This hypothesis finds some support in the fact that, within the DAC, 
the small countries – such as the Nordics – are more homogeneous and cohesive and have for 
long maintained an altruistic and progressive attitude towards foreign aid. In all these respects 
(GDP per capita, social transfers, income inequality and population size), Italy has fared and 
fares  quite  well  and  this  would  make  one  predict,  ceteris  paribus,  a  stronger  aid  to  GDP 
performance than the actual one. It is worth noting, however, that other theoretical models 
predict  the  opposite  effect.  For  instance,  if  aid  is  considered  a  ‘global  public  good’
6 
characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusion in consumption, the small countries may have 
an incentive to free-ride (by providing less aid) as they would be less affected at the margin by 
an overall under provision of global aid.
7 
 
3.2. HISTORICAL FACTORS  
Colonial  powers  such  as  France,  UK,  Portugal  and  Spain  have  traditionally  been 
important providers of aid to their former low income colonies (Round and Odedokun, 
2004).  The  influence  of  this  factor  on  the  aid  to  GDP  ratio  could  be  captured  for 
instance by the population size of former colonies with a current GDP per capita lower 
than $2,000 in purchasing power parity terms at 1995 prices. The type of colonization 
may also be an important factor, as former colonial powers such as the UK placed less 
importance  on  preserving  a  ‘special  relation’  with  their  former  subjects  than,  for 
instance, France which actively promotes the ‘Francophonie’ through foreign aid. Yet, 
as argued in the introduction, globalization may have loosened such historical ties. In 
addition, it is important to separate the effect of former colonial ties on the ‘aid level’ 
from that on ‘aid allocation’, as historical factors may be expected to play a role in aid 
allocation (Alesina and Dollar, 2002; Gates and Hoeffler, 2004) but not in the overall 
budgetary efforts. Indeed, top aid givers such as the Nordics lack a significant colonial 
                                                 
6 See the pioneering work of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) extended later on by Dudley (1977). 
7 The model developed by Schweinberger and Lahiri (2006) has been used to analyze the possible effect 
of  different  population  sizes  on  the  level  of  aid.  The  resulting  level  of  aid  per  capita  is  found  to  be 
negatively correlated with the donor's population.   13 
history, and – at least in this case - the impact on the aid to GDP ratio of proxies of 
past colonial linkages would be expected to be negative.
8 
Other major historical factors, such as the collapse of the Communist Bloc, socialist 
aid and competition in the Third World are likely to have reduced the incentives to 
provide  foreign  aid  for  strategic  and/or  security  reasons,  while  9/11  might  have, 
instead, shifted donor resources towards ‘security’ and away from ‘development and 
MDGs’. 
 
3.3. MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
Countries  with  large  budget  deficits  relative  to  their  GDP  (particularly  if  they  are 
subject to the Stability and Growth Pact), high past and current levels of public debt, 
a negative or weak trade balance (especially in the 1960s and 1970s when the ‘forex 
gap’ and a low level of foreign currency reserves over GDP acted as a constraint to the 
disbursement  of  aid  in  hard  currency),  and  low  government  spending  may  be 
expected – ceteris paribus – to face greater difficulties in setting aside an adequate 
amount of foreign aid because of strong pressures to reduce deficits and public debt 
and  preserve  scarce  foreign  currency  (the  theoretical  models  on  the  relationship 
between budget deficit, public debt and aid giving, are discussed in Mosley, 1985, and 
Faini, 2006). This may be the case of Italy and other highly indebted countries, or of 
countries with a chronic deficit in their balance of payments.  
Similar  considerations  can  be  made  for  countries  that  –  regardless  of  the  level  of 
public  spending  –  face  competing  claims  on  public  resources  because  of  high 
expenditures  on  debt  servicing,  public  investments  and  the  military.  Yet,  a  large 
military  expenditure  may  be  seen  as  complementary  to  aid  allocations  inspired  by 
geopolitical and strategic factors. For instance, Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) find a 
positive  relationship  between  military  expenditures  and  the  aid  volume  of  DAC 
countries, arguing that aid was used as a strategic instrument during the Cold War 
period. Thus, here too there is a problem of identification of the true relation (as the 
intentions of donors are obviously not made explicit) and the empirical results could 
be ambiguous. Also, it could be argued that – given the small volume of aid relative to 
GDP  –  the  overall  level  of  public  expenditure,  rather  than  its  allocation  among 
different expenditure chapters, influences the volume of aid. Finally, a large output 
gap (the difference between the maximum output achievable and the actual level of 
output) may also have a depressing effect on aid allocations. 
                                                 
8 One could argue that aid giving is indeed a substitute for colonial history, as it allows donor countries to 
strengthen those ties with developing countries that other donors have inherited from their colonial past.   14 
 
3.4.  INSTITUTIONAL  FEATURES  OF  AID  GIVING  AND  DONOR  GOVERNMENTS’  POLITICAL 
ORIENTATION  
Countries where aid is provided by an ‘independent aid agency’ may be less exposed 
to the whims of political-electoral cycles and thus exhibit higher and more stable aid 
to  GDP  ratios  than  countries  where  aid  decisions  are  taken  by  the  foreign  affairs 
ministry or the prime minister’s office, i.e. institutions exposed to conflicting demands 
for funds. The aid agencies could in fact be modeled as cohesive lobbies with a clear 
mission  and  aid  targets,  a  strong  self-interest  in  sustaining  aid  allocations,  and 
greater capacity to implement effectively aid programs and act independently from 
the donors’ and recipients’ lobbies, generating in this way greater development and 
political  returns  on  each  aid  dollar.  In  addition,  as  argued  by  Isernia  (1997), 
independent  aid  agencies  tend  to  show  greater  leadership  in  deciding  which 
developing countries need aid, and in elaborating meaningful development projects to 
propose to the recipient countries.  
The strength and size of the ‘independent national NGOs’ with capacity to collect funds 
from the civil society and limited funding dependence on the government
9can affect 
favorably overall aid to GDP levels. By playing the role of collective conscience and 
watchdog of national aid commitments, large NGOs and a progressive media with an 
interest in poverty and development issues (both of which are absent in Italy), may 
help focusing public attention on the development challenge, and the need to raise 
public aid allocations and to monitor the effectiveness of the programs implemented. 
In particular, it is plausible to assume that large, self-funded NGOs play an important 
role  in  monitoring  the  correct  and  timely  disbursement  of  aid  allocations  and  the 
quality of the programs and projects selected (both of which are main problems in the 
case of Italian aid). In addition, the large NGOs operate in many countries and their 
role could be subsumed as one of aid multinationals with important spillover effects on 
the mobilization of aid
10. 
The political orientation of governments (social-democrat vs. libertarian-conservative) 
may also play a role in determining aid  levels (Round and Odedokun, 2004; Faini, 
                                                 
9 Most  Italian NGOs depend for an important part of their financing on the Development Cooperation 
Directorate. 
10 The  classical  study  of  Mosley  (1985)  considered  the  discrepancies  between  the  donor  population’s 
desired level of aid and the perception of the actual level provided by the Government, arguing that while 
the  population  lobbies  in  favour  of  its  desired  aid  level,  the  Government  can  try  to  persuade  the 
electorate,  even  by  providing  false  information,  that  the  quantity  and  quality  of  aid  it  provides  is 
sufficient. Whenever this principal-agent problem is dominant in donor’s societies, an independent aid 
agency  would  facilitate  the  provision  of  factual  information  to  the  population,  since  it  may  be  in  its 
interest to make the Government provide more aid.   15 
2006), though this does not seem at first glance to have been the case in Italy. In fact, 
the  relation  between  political  orientation  and  aid  flows  is  rather  ambiguous,  as 
conservative  governments  may  allocate  more  aid  to  promote  national  commercial 
interests,  while  progressive  governments  may  provide  a  similar  amount  of  aid  for 
altruistic reasons. It is therefore impossible to disentangle econometrically these two 
effects on the basis of aggregate aid data. In addition, an independent aid agency 
may  be  able  to  preserve  an  appropriate  aid  level  and  allocation  regardless  of  the 
political orientation and aid preferences of the newly elected government.  
Other political factors such as a prominent international role – e.g. membership in the 
UN  Security  Council  or  Board  of  key  multilateral  agencies  –  may  also  play  a  role, 
though the evidence in this regard seems rather limited. In turn, as suggested also by 
Round and Odedokun (2004), ‘peer-effects’ – such as a formal pledge to increase aid 
by neighboring, reference or competing countries – might have a visible influence in 
determining aid allocations for reasons of prestige, competition and emulation. This 
hypothesis may be weakened, however, by the fact that several important donors (the 
US, Japan and until recently Germany) have not played a leadership role within the 
international  aid  community.  In  the  Italian  case,  it  can  be  surmised  that  the  aid 
policies  and  performance  of  France,  Germany  and  the  UK  may  be  of  particular 
relevance in determining – ceteris paribus – the level of aid over GDP. In this respect, 
the recent pledge of these three countries to reach the UN aid target in a few years 
may affect the level of the future Italian aid allocations. 
 
3.5. ALTERNATIVE VERSUS COMPLEMENTARY SOURCES OF FOREIGN FINANCE  
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  the  perceived  and  actual  role  of  aid  as  a  source  of 
development  finance  has  changed  considerably  over  the  last  few  decades.  In  this 
regard, it could be argued that the level of official aid might be influenced by the flow 
of other resources to the developing countries as a whole or to groups thereof (e.g. 
Sub-Saharan  Africa).  Indeed,  bilateral  or  multilateral  aid  is  just  one  of  several 
different ways through which developing countries can secure hard currency to finance 
their development. In fact, aid policies and aid provision can be – and often are – 
influenced by the amount of other financial flows received by developing countries in 
the  form  of  private  aid,  multilateral  or  bank  loans,  portfolio  flows,  FDI,  export 
proceeds  (which  depend  on  trade  openness  in  commercial  partners),  and  migrant 
remittances.  Overall  aid  flows  may  have  thus  become  less  relevant  for  those 
developing countries (including some that still have a low level of income per capita) 
that were able to secure an adequate amount of foreign currency from other sources.   16 
A first alternative source of hard currency in developing countries is private aid. Thus, 
one could surmise that countries with high private aid to GDP ratios allocate fewer 
resources to Official Development Assistance, and that public aid plays a subsidiary 
role to private aid in achieving an overall national aid target, leading in this way to a 
‘substitution effect’ between private and public aid. Yet, the opposite could also be 
true, as the same factors that generate high levels of private aid might raise public aid 
allocations.  Both  such  hypotheses  are,  however,  difficult  to  test  because  recorded 
private aid flows are generally quite small and grossly under-recorded
11.  
 











Australia  0.033  0.020  0.025  0.061 
Austria  0.024  0.022  0.028  0.034 
Belgium  0.035  0.020  0.020  0.049 
Canada  0.047  0.043  0.041  0.044 
Denmark  0.016  0.020  0.025  0.014 
Finland  0.013  0.027  0.008  0.008 
France  0.004  0.010  0.011  n.a. 
Germany  0.042  0.052  0.049  0.045 
Greece  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.004 
Ireland  n.a.  0.054  0.057  0.122 
Italy  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002 
Japan  0.002  0.004  0.005  0.006 
Luxembourg  n.a.  0.000  0.031  0.021 
Netherlands  0.032  0.072  0.077  0.070 
New Zealand  0.039  0.026  0.027  0.027 
Norway  0.048  0.065  0.090  0.084 
Portugal  n.a.  0.001  0.001  0.002 
Spain  n.a.  0.001  0.016  n.a. 
Sweden  0.052  0.061  0.035  0.009 
Switzerland  0.053  0.050  0.052  0.082 
United Kingdom  0.025  0.028  0.037  0.024 
United States  0.048  0.039  0.046  0.083 
Average  0.030  0.029  0.032  0.040 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD DAC data 
 
OECD (2000) defines NGO grants as “expenditures by national NGOs on development 
assistance  and  relief,  together  with  any  additional  contributions  in  kind,  made  to 
developing countries, multilateral organizations, or international NGOs” (OECD, 2000; 
p.  30)  net  of  the  support  received  from  the  governmental  institutions,  but  such  a 
definition suffers from severe conceptual and recording problems
12.  
                                                 
11 The theoretical reference here is Schweinberger and Lahiri (2006) who developed a model in which 
altruistic households in the donor country want to ‘consume’ foreign aid, being it public or private. In this 
sense, as public aid is compulsorily collected through taxation, they adjust their private aid consumption 
in order to maximize their utility. However, their model assumes perfect information. To the extent that 
donor’s population is not well informed of the level and quality of official development assistance provided 
by its Government, private aid will be obviously less correlated with public one. On this, see also Hayashi 
(2002) and Chong and Gradstein (2006). 
12 The problems of under-reporting can be of two types: first,  flows are difficult to track,  and this is 
particularly true when the NGO sector is highly fragmented and ‘informal’; second, financial flows are a   17 
As shown in Table 7, private aid flows are usually less than 0.1 percent of GDP, with 
the noticeable exception of Ireland over 2000-04. Among the most virtuous private 
donors  one  finds  Norway,  Switzerland,  Ireland  and  the  United  States.  During  the 
recent period, grants from US NGOs exceeded $3 billion a year, making the country 
the largest private donor in the DAC, and in 2004 they reached $10.4 billion or 49 
percent of total public aid. 
Italian private aid flows, in contrast, are the lowest of all DAC (0.002 percent of GDP 
over 2000-04). This is puzzling, as the Italian aid system is characterized by a high-
density network of small and medium religious and lay NGOs. However, the DAC data 
on Italy may not be far from the truth, and their low level may only reflect a highly 
fragmented  NGO  system,  their  high  dependency  on  public  funds,  and  the  limited 
fundraising  capacity  of  a  highly  ‘decentralized  co-operation  system’.  However,  to 
nuance  this  negative  picture,  it  must  also  be  noted  that  under-reporting  problems 
may be particularly intense in Italy, as the atomization of the NGOs system increases 
the difficulties faced by the Government in assessing private aid flows. In addition, it 
is likely that a myriad minuscule aid flows channeled by parishes and other Catholic 
organizations escape entirely official registration. 
In spite of all this, the joint examination of Tables 1 and 7 suggests it is unlikely that 
in  Italy  and  the  majority  of  DAC  countries  private  aid  can  be  considered  a  valid 
substitute of official development assistance. Even, in the US and Ireland, i.e. donors 
with  a  strong  private  philanthropic  tradition,  the  2000-04  private  aid  flows  ranged 
between  0.08  and  0.1  percent  of  GDP
13.  Second,  with  the  rare  exceptions  just 
mentioned, private aid flows correlate positively with public aid flows, suggesting that 
public  and  private  morality  in  this  area  reinforce  each  other.  Only  Sweden, 
Luxembourg and Finland show a correlation coefficient between private and public aid 
flows of less than 0.55. 
Debt  cancellation,  may  also  be  seen  as  a  substitute  of  aid  flows  (net  of  debt 
cancellation).  Indeed,  this  argument  is  often  mentioned  in  some  aid  organization, 
though it is generally accepted that the impact of ‘fresh aid’ is far greater than that of 
debt cancellation, as the debt was not being serviced or reimbursed (Cohen, 1996). 
Foreign loans are often seen as a substitute of aid flows (especially in middle income 
developing countries) and there is evidence that such substitution has taken place in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
poor measure of the actual flow of resources, since many members of the NGOs work on a voluntary 
basis or are paid considerably less than the market value of their services (personal communication of Mr. 
Y. Ahmad, DAC Directorate, Paris, 16 May, 2007). 
13 The creation of new huge US private foundations may, however, change in the future the nature of aid 
flows to developing countries.   18 
some  of  these  countries,  especially  in  Latin  America.  The  relation  between  FDI  in 
developing  countries  and  public  aid  is  unclear  and  probably  not  significant
14.  The 
literature (e.g. Kimura and Todo, 2007; Karakaplan et al., 2005) suggests that there 
might be a complementary relationship between aid and foreign direct investments, 
with the former acting as a vanguard of the latter. However, this effect could play a 
role  in  the  allocation  of  aid,  favoring  those  recipient  countries  where  the  donor  is 
planning to invest, rather than raising its total volume. One could instead expect a 
relation of substitutability with the aggregate outflow of FDI to developing countries, 
as a better access to private capital markets could  lower the donors’ incentives to 
allocate aid funds to these countries. 
Trade concessions (measured for instance by the volume of competing imports from 
developing countries – e.g. imports of agricultural, textile and other low tech goods, 
or the lowering of tariffs on such goods) could also be seen as a substitute of foreign 
aid. Several authors (e.g. Elbadawi, 1999; Adam and O’Connell, 2004) have argued 
that trade liberalization has a stronger development potential than foreign assistance. 
If this is so, there is a case for granting free access to the donors’ markets while using 
resources  previously  directed  to  development  assistance  for  compensating  the 
domestic producers who have been penalized by trade liberalization (Browne, 1999). 
However, in low income countries with a limited export capacity due to infrastructural 
and other bottlenecks, trade concessions cannot be seen as a substitute of foreign aid. 
Just the opposite. In such cases, ‘aid–for-trade’ may likely be needed to improve the 
future trade earnings of backward developing countries (Hoekman and Prowse, 2005). 
In  this  case,  the  short  term  relation  between  aid-and-trade  would  be  one  of 
complementarity, while in the long term it might be one of substitution.  
Finally,  openness  to  migration  originating  in  developing  countries  might  also  be 
considered  an  effective  substitute  of  aid  allocations.  Kapur  (2005)  argues  that  the 
slogan ‘migration not aid’ could well replace the older ‘trade not aid’ in negotiations 
between  developed  and  developing  countries,  given  the  increasing  relevance  of 
remittances  in  the  balance  of  payments  of  many  of  the  latter.  Alternatively,  Schiff 
(1994)  argues  from  a  political  economic  perspective  that  foreign  aid  may  increase 
migration as, by increasing poor people’s income, it may help them finance the high 
costs of international migration. This could be particularly true, if  the quantity and 
quality  of  aid  inflow  is  not  enough  to  increase  employment  and  income-earning 
opportunities in the countries of origin.  
                                                 
14 Testing of such hypothesis is problematic as the outward FDI data are not disaggregated by country of 
destination.   19 
Openness  to  migration  could  be  proxied  by  an  estimate  of  remittances  over  GDP 
originating  from  each  donor.  Yet,  in  the  balance  of  payments,  remittances  are  not 
disaggregated  by  countries  of  destination,  and  there  is  a  risk  that  evidence  of 
increasing remittances to middle-income developing countries may be used to reduce 
aid  flows  to  low  income  ones.  Alternatively,  openness  to  migration  could  be  more 
directly proxied by the stock of immigrants over the resident population. Yet, a large 
presence of migrant workers could lead – or be perceived to lead – to an increase in 
social expenditures in favor of the migrants, with the effect of depressing budgetary 
allocations to foreign aid.  
 
4. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS OF AID EFFORT  
 
The model presented hereafter aims at estimating the impact of many of the factors 
discussed above on the level of aid supply in DAC countries.  
 
4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In this study, the dependent variable (‘aid supply’ or ‘aid effort’) is proxied by net aid 
disbursements over GDP, as this ratio measures most appropriately the true aid effort. 
Aid comprises bilateral or multilateral concessional flows (i.e. with a grant element of 
at least 25 percent) allocated by state agencies for the promotion of economic and 
human  development  in  developing  countries.  It  includes  the  official  assistance 
directed to countries in transition from socialism to capitalism. Aid data originate from 
DAC Table 1 (www.oecd.org/stats). It was decided not to use aid commitments as 
these  would  reward  donors  for  systematically  over-promising  aid  as  well  as 
underestimating  the  absorptive  capacity  of  aid  recipients  (Roodman,  2007). 
Furthermore, we excluded debt relief from the definition of aid, as debt cancellation 
does  not  give  rise  to  an  actual  disbursement  of  funds,  and  may  even  imply  a 
double-counting of aid if the debt that is canceled was granted on a concessional basis. 
As suggested in Section 2, an alternative and possibly more accurate measure of ‘aid 
effort’ is ‘aid to low income developing countries (LDCs)’. Information on bilateral aid 
flows  by  the  income  level  of  recipient  countries  is  taken  from  the  DAC  Table  2a 
(www.oecd.org/stats).  Moreover,  all  multilateral  aid  provided  by  each  donor  to  the 
United  Nations  agencies  or  to  the  International  Development  Agency  (IDA)  of  the 
World  Bank  was  conventionally  assigned  to  the  low  income  countries.  Finally,  the 
allocations of aid channeled through  the European Commission (EC) requires some   20 
caution, as the EC assigns to bilateral aid only part of the resources received from the 
Member Countries, while the rest is allocated to multilateral aid agencies. Furthermore, 
only part of the bilateral aid channeled via the EC is directed to low income countries. 
Luckily, information provided by the EC itself permits to solve this problem
15. As a 
result, each donor’s aid to low income developing countries is defined as the sum of 
‘Bilateral  Aid  to  LDCs’,  ‘Multilateral  Aid’  and  the  ‘Multilateral  Aid  allocated  by  each 
donor to the European Community’, with this latter term multiplied for the share of 
total aid allocated by the EC to LDCs and to multilateral agencies. However, as this 
variable correlates closely with the aid to GDP ratio (the average country correlation 
coefficient is 0.89), it has not been used in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
4.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
Among the possible determinants of ‘aid effort’, the following ones were retained in 
our model. They are presented following the subdivision adopted in Section 3: 
 
(i) Structural variables: real income per capita is measured by the logarithm of real 
per capita GDP in PPP terms
16. Income Inequality is proxied by the Gini coefficients of 
the  distribution  of  gross  income  taken  from  the  2007  Globalization-Health  Nexus 
Database  (Cornia  et  al.,  2007)  –  that  relies  mainly  on  the  2005  World  Income 
Inequality Database of 28 June 2005 published by the WIDER. The original average 
five-year observations of Cornia et al. (2007) were interpolated to obtain yearly Gini 
estimates; population size is the logarithm of the population of DAC countries taken 
from World Bank (2006b). The extent of government intervention and redistribution is 
proxied by the ratio of government receipts on GDP taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook  (www.oecd.org/stats),  as  in  the  DAC  countries  a  high  (and  generally 
progressive taxation) has been shown to give rise to redistributive public expenditures 
that considerably reduce the degree of polarization of the distribution of disposable 
income in relation to that of market income. 
 
                                                 
15 The EC provides information on commitments, and gross and net disbursements, as well as the share 
of aid directed to low income developing countries. We first analyzed the extent to which total gross flows 
from DAC countries to EC correlate with EC gross disbursements. Results of the panel regression for all 
the DAC countries showed that gross disbursements are highly correlated (overall R
2 > 0.98) to total DAC 
countries' disbursements. We, then, assumed that the share of aid directed to developing countries within 
EC bilateral disbursements and the share of multilateral aid within EC total disbursements is constant 
across all EC donors and over time. Details of the panel analysis are available from the authors upon 
request. 
16 Heston et al. (2006).   21 
(ii) Historical factors: information on past colonial history of donor countries comes 
from  several  publications  and  websites.  The  variable  used  in  the  model  is  the 
logarithm of the population of former colonies that have a gross national income per 
capita (measured with the Atlas method) of less than $2,000. 
 
(iii)  Macroeconomic  determinants:  the  fiscal  balance  is  proxied  by  the  budget 
deficit over GDP and the level of public debt (net of public financial assets)
17 over GDP 
taken from various issues of OECD Economic Outlook. The time series on fiscal deficit 
and public debt were also interacted with a dummy variable that signals a violation of 
the Growth and Stability Pact (i.e. a deficit and a public debt in excess of 3 and 60 
percent of GDP respectively) signed by EU countries. Such dummy is used also for 
non-signatory  countries,  to  test  for  a  differential  impact  on  aid  of  large  fiscal 
imbalances. The construction of these two alternative dummies is meant to correct the 
informational  limitations  of  the  budget  deficit  and  public  debt  variables,  as  these 
measure the fiscal position and not the fiscal stance. Trade balance over GDP and the 
output  gap  are  derived  from  the  OECD  Economic  Outlook  (www.oecd.org/stats);  a 
negative gap indicates that the GDP falls short of its estimated potential level. 
 
(iv) Institutional features: Independent aid agency: information on the existence 
of national aid agencies operating independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was obtained by means of an online research of institutional websites of the 22 DAC 
countries.  Peer  effects:  Round  and  Odedokun  (2004)  define  this  variable  as  the 
average – weighted by the donor countries' GDP – of the aid to GDP ratio. As this 
measure is clearly driven by the behavior of larger countries, this paper proxies this 
variable with the average unweighted aid over GDP of other DAC countries, that is 
lagged  by  one  year  in  the  regression  to  avoid  simultaneity  problems.  Political 
orientation  is  defined  by  a  dummy  variable  taking  value  of  -1  for  center-left 
governments, 0 for moderate governments, and 1 for center-right governments. The 
information comes from the Database of Political Institutions that is available online 
from www.worldbank.org, and that is described in Beck et al. (2001). 
 
(v) Alternative sources of foreign finance: data on the immigrant stock, which is 
defined as the share of immigrant population on the country's total population, come 
                                                 
17  Because  of  data  limitations,  we  employed  gross  financial  liabilities  for  Greece,  Luxembourg  and 
Portugal.  To  cover  missing  data,  we  integrated  OECD  series  with  data  from  the  IMF  International 
Financial Statistics for Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.   22 
from World Bank (2006a), and it is meant to be a proxy for the level of remittances 
originating from a country. 
 
4.3. COUNTRIES AND PERIOD ANALYZED  
The  analysis  covers  the  22  DAC  countries  that  –  together  with  the  EU  -  have 
traditionally been the main aid providers. Aid is also delivered by non-DAC donors. Till 
1989,  the  communist  countries  of  Europe  provided  large  amounts  of  aid  to  their 
satellites  but  its  volume  relative  to  GDP  is  difficult  to  measure  due  to  various 
statistical problems. Since the mid 1970s the OPEC countries have also provided aid 
to the developing countries though in some cases, as in that of Saudi Arabia, such aid 
focused more on the promotion of religious values than on fostering development. In 
recent years, China has emerged as a new important donor. Data about these other 
donors is however scant. For these reasons, the non-DAC donors were excluded from 
the analysis. The period considered is  1970-2004, as not all  data are available for 
2005-6.  
 
4.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics (number of observations, average, standard 
deviation  and  minimum  and  maximum  of  the  variables  used  in  the  regression 
analysis).  The  table  shows  that  in  most  cases  the  variables  show  considerable 
variations  a  fact  that  should  improve  the  estimates  of  the  parameters  (see  for 
instance the data on the ratio of deficit and debt
18 over GDP). 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  Max 
Aid
a  710  0.406  0.245  0.013  1.171 
Aid, excluding debt relief
a  710  0.395  0.241  0.013  1.171 
Real income per capita, PPP constant 
dollars   770  19,575  6,178  6,987  50,751 
Output Gap
a  684  -0.58  2.47  -12.01  6.37 
Trade Balance
a  770  0.5  5.0  -16.7  21.6 
Fiscal Deficit
a  694  -1.9  6.5  -15.7  88.0 
Public Debt
a  692  36.5  30.8  -30.8  132.6 
Government Revenue
a  694  42.2  9.3  21.5  69.0 
Development Agency  741  0.348  0.477  0  1 
Peer Effect  770  0.392  0.041  0.290  0.493 
FDI to LDC, $ million per year  770  71,588  82,894  2,466  260,236 
Violation of G&S Pact, signatories  770  0.053  0.224  0  1 
                                                 
18 The minimum value of the public debt can be negative as the definition adopted is of gross government 
liabilities, that can be negative – as in the case of Norway – if the government owns sizeable assets.   23 
Violation of G&S Pact. All countries  770  0.471  0.499  0  1 
Migrants, in percent of resident 
population  770  8.89  7.40  0.57  37.83 
Population, ln  770  16.41  1.43  12.74  19.50 
Gini coefficient  526  33.8  4.9  20.3  45.5 
Debt cancellation
a  770  0.010  0.025  0  0.275 
Pop. living in poor former colonies, 
million  770  92.1  274.0  0  1,760.1 
Political Orientation  737  0.027  0.930  -1  1 
Note: 
a signals that the variable is expressed as a ratio to GDP. 
 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
 
4.5. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL AND ESTIMATION APPROACH  
The  paper  aims  at  estimating  by  means  of  a  standard  regression  analysis  the 
determinants of the official development assistance to GDP ratio for the 22 OECD DAC 
countries. This ratio for the country i in year t, yit, is modelled as a linear function of a 
vector Xit of explanatory variables: 
 
  
[1]  b b b b it it i it y = X + ε , where  = a it i it ε +η   for i=1,...,22. 
 
We impose the restriction that b b b bi =b b b b, for i = 1,..., 22, as the limited time dimension of 
the panel leaves no other option than pooling the data; we formally test the adequacy 
of this restriction by means of a Chow test. The error term εit in [1] is composed by a 
country-specific  time-invariant  effect  ai -  that  may  correlate  with  the  vector  of 
regressors  Xit  -  and  by  a  disturbance  term  ( ) h h s
2
it that we assume i.i.d. 0, ,  that  is 
assumed not to correlate with Xit and the normality of which is not required (Baltagi, 
2002).  The  opportunity  to  include  country-specific  effects  is  formally  tested 
performing an F test on the null hypothesis that all ai  are jointly equal to zero, and a 
Breusch-Pagan  test.  Furthermore,  as  both  pooled  OLS  estimators  and  fixed  and 
random  effect  panel  estimators  rest  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  stationarity  of  the 
variables’ time series, this assumption has been tested following Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) for the explanatory variables, and with a Dickey-Fuller test for the dependent 
variable,  as  the  analysis  of  the  descriptive  statistics  on  the  official  development 
assistance  to  GDP  ratio  suggest  that  the  series  could  have  different  statistical 
characteristics across the 22 donor countries. 
The Dickey-Fuller test, the results of which are presented in Table 9, does not reject 
the null hypothesis that the dependent variable contains a unit root for 17 out of the 
22 donor countries. For this subset of countries, we then chose to include the lagged 
value of the dependent variable among the regressors, as otherwise the regression   24 
would  have  been  imbalanced,  and  the  residuals  could  have  been  non  stationary. 
Remarkably,  as  it  will  be  discussed  in  Section  4.6,  the  inclusion  of  the  lagged 
dependent variable does not affect the sign and significance of all but one of the other 
regressors.  
 
Table 9. Dickey-Fuller test for the stationarity of the series 
 
  Dickey-Fuller test for unit root 
 
ODA over GDP 
ODA, excluding debt 
relief, over GDP 
Country 
obs.  test  approx.     
p-value 
obs.  test 
approx.      
p-value 
Australia  34  -2.513  0.11  34  -2.488  0.12 
Austria  34  -2.881  0.05  34  -3.147  0.02 
Belgium  34  -2.812  0.06  34  -1.924  0.32 
Canada  34  -0.904  0.79  34  -1.420  0.57 
Denmark  34  -1.992  0.29  34  -1.794  0.38 
Finland  34  -1.729  0.42  34  -1.759  0.40 
France  34  -1.262  0.65  34  -1.479  0.54 
Germany  34  -1.852  0.36  34  -2.244  0.19 
Greece  8  -1.498  0.53  8  -1.498  0.53 
Ireland  30  -1.223  0.66  30  -1.223  0.66 
Italy  34  -1.704  0.43  34  -1.728  0.42 
Japan  34  -2.035  0.27  34  -1.440  0.56 
Luxembourg  24  0.195  0.97  24  0.195  0.97 
Netherlands  34  -2.280  0.18  34  -2.347  0.16 
New Zealand  34  -2.268  0.18  34  -2.287  0.18 
Norway  34  -2.625  0.09  34  -2.612  0.09 
Portugal  24  -0.159  0.94  24  -0.149  0.94 
Spain  24  -1.451  0.56  24  -1.457  0.55 
Sweden  34  -3.363  0.01  34  -3.696  0.00 
Switzerland  34  -1.238  0.66  34  -1.450  0.56 
United 
Kingdom  34  -2.512  0.11  34  -2.837  0.05 
United States  34  -2.939  0.04  34  -2.880  0.05 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
 
Note that the choice to include the lagged dependent variable among the regressors is 
not only driven by statistical considerations, but is also grounded in a strong economic 
rationale,  since  the  persistence  in  budgetary  allocations  determines  a  significant 
path-dependence  in  the  evolution  of  aid  effort  (Faini,  2006;  Roodman,  2007). 
Notwithstanding some concerns about the stationarity of some of the regressors,
19 we 
chose to stick to either OLS or panel estimators, as panel cointegration techniques 
would be severely hindered by the short time span covered by the data. 
                                                 
19 The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) tests on the stationarity of the regressors – not reported here, but 
available upon request from the authors - provided mixed evidence: most of them, with the exceptions of 
the public debt, budget deficit and government revenues over GDP, do not contain a unit root. For both 
the budget deficit and the debt, the null hypothesis is rejected when the number of lags is increased, so 
as to allow for serial correlation of the residuals, while even after such transformation the government 
revenue still contains a unit root in all series.   25 
The tests on the poolability of the data are presented in Table 10 that reports the 
Chow tests performed on the preferred model specification (specification 1 in Table 
11). The Chow tests warns against poolability, as the null hypothesis is rejected at 
conventional confidence level for all but one regressors. As the focus of our paper is 
on Italy, we also performed the Chow test including in the model specification only a 
set  of  interactions  with  the  dummy  variable  for  Italy,  and  the  results  signal  a 
significantly  different  slope  coefficient  only  for  two  regressors,  namely  the  trade 
balance and, to a lesser extent, the real per capita income.  
 
Table 10. Chow test for poolability of the data (specifications 1 and 2 in Table 11) 
 
 
poolability  poolability, 
Italy 
Variables 
Chow test                   
(p-value) 
Chow test                    
(p-value) 
Lagged aid, countries 
with non stationary 
series 
1.83                      
(0.029)** 
0.99                      
(0.407) 
Debt cancellation
a  1.69                      
(0.042)** 
1.48                      
(0.225) 
Real per capita income, 
ln 
2.65                      
(0.000)*** 




2.10                      
(0.004)*** 
7.99                     
(0.005)*** 
Govt revenues
a  3.46                      
(0.000)*** 
0.18                      
(0.675) 
Public debt
a  1.92                      
(0.001)*** 
1.97                      
(0.161) 
Primary fiscal deficit
a  1.87                      
(0.013)** 
0.81                      
(0.370) 





3.30                      
(0.000)*** 
1.37                      
(0.242) 
Output gap*Dev. Ag. 
2.44                      
(0.025)** 
- 
Peer effect   2.50                      
(0.000)*** 
1.03                      
(0.311) 
No. of countries  22  22 
No. of observations  558  558 
 
Notes: 
a  signals that the variable is expressed as a 
ratio to GDP; *, ** and *** denote significance at 
the  10,  5  and  1  percent  confidence  level 
respectively. 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
 
The limited number of observations precludes the option to lift the restriction that b b b bi 
=b b b b, for i = 1,..., 22, but the evidence provided by the Chow tests strongly suggests 
the need to carry out robustness tests on the stability of the estimated coefficients, 
namely restricting the estimation to a subset of either countries or years, as in Round 
and Odedokun (2004).   26 
Finally, to choose between OLS and panel estimators, we performed a Breusch-Pagan 
LM  and  F-tests  on  all  the  proposed  specifications.  The  tests  strongly  confirm  the 
presence of country-specific effects in the error term eit (Table 11). This signals the 
lack of efficiency of the OLS estimator, as the variance-covariance matrix of eit is not 
spherical,  suggesting  therefore  to  rely  on  panel  estimators.  The  choice  between 
random  and  fixed  effects  panel  estimators  was  done  by  means  of  a  Hausman 
specification test. 
 
4.6. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 11 reports the estimates of 12 alternative specifications of model [1] obtained 
by  changing  either  the  variables  included  in  the  vector  Xit  of  regressors  or  the 
estimation procedure, or by restricting the analysis to a subset of years and countries 
to test the robustness of the estimates. All the specifications in Table 11 contain a 
core  set  of  11  regressors,  to  which  we  separately  add  other  7  regressors  in 
specifications  (6)  to  (12).  Rather  than  discussing  the  results  of  each  model 
specification one by one, we provide an overview of the estimates of the parameters 
of  each  regressor,  assessing  whether  they  are  robust  and  consistent  with  the 
expectations about their sign and size presented in Section 3. The dependent variable 
is aid excluding debt cancellation over GDP, while the same set of model specifications 
with  aid  over  GDP  as  the  dependent  variable  are  included  in  Table  A1  in  the 
Appendix.
20 
The main regression results are presented describing the estimated coefficients of the 
explanatory variables, divided into the usual five groups: 
 
(i) Structural variables: the coefficient of the natural logarithm of the real income 
per capita  is positive but generally not significantly  different from zero, suggesting 
that donors’ affluence is not a main determinant of aid once we control for the other 
relevant factors. This variable becomes significant only when the Gini coefficient of the 
income distribution or the population of the donor countries are included among the 
regressors (specifications  8  and  12  respectively). Gini  coefficient:  the  coefficient  of 
this  variable  is  negative  and  statistically  significant,  confirming  the  inverse  relation 
assumed ex ante between domestic income inequality and aid effort. Population: such 
variable is negative and statistically significant, a result consistent with the literature 
                                                 
20 In Table A1, all parameters but debt cancellation and violation of the G&S Pact maintain the same sign 
and significance level; debt cancellation is instead positive but not significant, signaling that debt relief 
does not produce a significant upward effect on aid effort. This result is consistent with the estimates of 
Table 11 that are discussed below.   27 
on aid giving. A higher government revenue to GDP ratio is systematically associated 
with  a  higher  aid  disbursement,  and  the  estimated  effect  is  both  statistically  and 
economically significant. An increase by 5 percentage points in government revenue 
over GDP is estimated to increase foreign aid by 0.1 percent of GDP. As argued in 
Section 3, this coefficient  is  likely to be  driven by both a pure size effect – larger 
budget leaves more room for aid granting - and a redistribution effect – as greater 
revenue is associated with a more pronounced income redistribution, both domestic 
and North-South. 
  
(ii)  Historical  factors:  as noted in Section 4.2, the variable that proxies colonial 
past measures the population living in former colonies with a current per capita GNI 
below $2,000 at 1995 prices. An increase in such variable may be interpreted as an 
increase in the ‘aid demand’ in former colonies to which former colonial rules respond 
by increasing their ‘aid supply’. However, as already noted, several important donors 
(such as the Scandinavian countries) have no colonial past, and this is expected to 
affect the expected positive sign of the coefficient of such variable. Indeed, contrary 
to  the  expectations,  the  variable  has  a  negative  though  just  marginally  significant 
effect on the aid to GDP ratio (specification 11). 
 
(iii)  Macroeconomic  determinants:  as  in  Round  and  Odedokun  (2004),  the 
parameter of the fiscal deficit is positive in all specifications, suggesting that a rise in 
the  budget  deficit  would  raise  the  level  of  foreign  aid.  This  runs  contrary  to  the 
expectations  illustrated  in  Section  3  and  the  results  obtained  by  Faini  (2006).
21
                                                 
21 Round and Odedokun (2004) report that “fiscal balance does not appear to influence aid policy [...] in 
the equation where fiscal surplus relative to GDP is a regressor, its coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant, contrary to expectations” (emphasis added). They argue that “aid, because of its immense 
importance as a veritable foreign policy tool of donor governments, is not a particularly discretionary item 
in the budget” (Round and Odedokun, 2004; p.306). This argumentation, however, runs contrary to our 
expectation of a pro-cyclical patter of foreign aid.     
Table 11. Determinants of aid effort
  Dependent variable: aid, excluding debt cancellation, over GDP 
Variables                        Model Specification 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Lagged aid, countries with non stationary 
series 
0.597                
(11.88)*** 
0.543                
(13.38)*** 
-  0.682                
(15.91)*** 
0.634                
(13.37)*** 
0.597                
(11.85)*** 
0.591                
(11.45)*** 
0.589                
(8.90)*** 
0.595                
(11.66)*** 
0.592                
(11.65)*** 
0.598                
(11.97)*** 
0.578                
(11.24)*** 
Debt cancellation
a  -0.683                
(-4.29)*** 
-0.708                
(-4.82)*** 
-0.781                
(-4.78)*** 
-0.555                
(-2.91)*** 
-0.693                
(-4.08)*** 
-0.683                
(-4.28)*** 
-0.671         
(-4.14)*** 
-0.936                
(-7.11)*** 
-0.680                
(-4.26)*** 
-0.701                
(-4.33)*** 
-0.673                
(-4.21)*** 
-0.697                
(-4.58)*** 
Real per capita income, ln 
0.024               
(1.06) 
0.018             
(0.77) 
0.007                
(0.27) 
0.012               
(0.53) 
0.048               
(1.74)* 
0.024               
(1.07) 
0.028               
(1.19) 
0.208              
(3.73)*** 
0.016              
(0.54) 
0.028              
(1.20) 
0.032              
(1.33) 




0.006             
(4.02)*** 
0.006             
(4.78)*** 
0.010             
(6.82)*** 
-0.000             
(-0.22) 
0.003             
(2.68)*** 
0.006             
(3.97)*** 
0.006             
(4.01)*** 
0.004             
(2.70)*** 
0.006             
(3.99)*** 
0.005             
(3.93)*** 
0.005             
(3.87)*** 
0.005             
(3.37)*** 
Government revenues
a  0.014                   
(6.40)*** 
0.015                   
(8.99)*** 
0.021                   
(10.39)*** 
0.005                   
(2.85)*** 
0.012                   
(6.35)*** 
0.014                   
(6.37)*** 
0.014                   
(6.36)*** 
0.009                   
(3.90)*** 
0.014                   
(6.23)*** 
0.013                   
(6.40)*** 
0.014                   
(6.38)*** 
0.013                   
(6.17)*** 
Public debt
a  -0.001              
(-5.31)*** 
-0.001              
(-6.64)*** 
-0.002              
(-8.15)*** 
-0.001              
(-3.91)*** 
-0.001              
(-3.99)*** 
-0.001              
(-5.29)*** 
-0.001          
(-5.28)*** 
-0.002              
(-5.26)*** 
-0.001              
(-5.33)*** 
-0.001              
(-5.11)*** 
-0.001              
(-5.19)*** 




0.010          
(4.94)*** 
0.010          
(5.86)*** 
0.014          
(8.42)*** 
0.003          
(2.69)*** 
0.007          
(4.13)*** 
0.010          
(4.96)*** 
0.010          
(4.92)*** 
0.009          
(4.22)*** 
0.010          
(4.90)*** 
0.010          
(5.05)*** 
0.010          
(4.91)*** 
0.010          
(4.87)*** 
Development Agency  0.010                
(0.59) 
0.022                
(1.40) 
0.024                
(1.29) 
0.016                
(0.91) 
-0.000                
(-0.01) 
0.010                
(0.58) 
0.008                
(0.47) 
0.014                
(1.09) 
0.011                
(0.63) 
0.010                
(0.60) 
0.008                
(0.50) 
0.007                
(0.39) 
Output gap
a  0.009            
(3.92)*** 
0.009            
(3.93)*** 
0.010            
(3.88)*** 
0.004            
(2.18)** 
0.008            
(4.01)*** 
0.009            
(3.97)*** 
0.009            
(3.92)*** 
0.006            
(2.37)** 
0.009            
(3.89)*** 
0.009            
(4.08)*** 
0.008            
(3.84)*** 
0.007            
(3.15)*** 
Output gap*Dev. Ag.  -0.009                
(-2.76)*** 
-0.009                
(-2.59)*** 
-0.007                
(-2.15)** 
-0.010                
(-4.19)*** 
-0.013                
(-3.21)*** 
-0.009                
(-2.75)*** 
-0.009                
(-2.81)*** 
-0.007                
(-2.03)** 
-0.009                
(-2.70)*** 
-0.009                
(-2.80)*** 
-0.008                
(-2.69)*** 
-0.008                
(-2.66)*** 
Peer effect   -0.025                
(-0.28) 
-0.042                
(-0.46) 
0.056                
(0.49) 
0.070                
(0.75) 
0.066                
(-0.64) 
0.025                
(-0.28) 
-0.041                
(-0.45) 
-0.113                
(-1.04) 
-0.020                
(-0.22) 
-0.032                
(-0.36) 
-0.010                
(-0.11) 
-0.003                
(-0.04) 
Violation of the G&SP  -  -  -  -  - 
0.000                
(0.00) 
-  -  -  -  -  - 
Violation of the G&SP, all   -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.017                
(-1.29) 
-  -  -  -  - 
Gini coefficient  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.013                
(-5.19)*** 
-  -  -  - 
Migrants  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.001                
(0.49)  -  -  - 
Political orientation  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.007                
(1.87)* 
-  - 
Population in poor former  colonies, ln   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.016                
(-1.67)* 
- 
Population, ln  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.336                
(-4.00)*** 
Countries, obs.  22, 558  22, 558  22, 560  22, 464  15, 370  22, 560  22, 560  20, 386  22, 558  22, 554  22, 558  22, 558 
Overall R
2  0.599  0.642  0.621  0.395  0.732  0.599  0.605  0.525  0.595  0.598  0.491  0.387 
Estimator  FE  RE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  RE  RE 
F-test with FE, Breusch-Pagan LM test with 
RE 
70.23                    
(0.00) 
3192.44                   
(0.00) 
63.87                    
(0.00) 
102.98                    
(0.00) 
47.61                    
(0.00) 
69.82                    
(0.00) 
67.68                    
(0.00) 
61.63                   
(0.00) 
58.09                    
(0.00) 
65.58                    
(0.00) 
69.91                    
(0.00) 
71.74                   
(0.00) 
Hausman test (p-value)  10.86                               
(0.45) 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
Notes: t-statistics within parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level respectively; the set of regressors also contains a constant term; 
a  signals that the regressor is expressed as a 
ratio to GDP. FE and RE refers to the ‘fixed effects’ or ‘random effects’ procedures alternatively adopted for the estimation of the parameters.   
1
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As argued in Section 4.2, this puzzling result may be due to the difficulty of measuring 
the fiscal stance, as a weak budgetary position – or a significant debt overhang – may 
not have a detrimental impact on foreign aid provided that the government adopts an 
accommodating  attitude  towards  these  fiscal  disequilibria.  By  the  same  token,  the 
positive coefficient of the fiscal deficit could also possibly be explained looking at the 
evolution  of  the  primary  deficits  of  the  countries  with  a  huge  debt  overhang,  as 
Belgium and Italy: large primary surpluses were attained in an attempt to reduce the 
debt burden – as in Italy in the early 1990s – so that they are actually signal a very 
strict fiscal policy, rather than signalling  a fiscal bonanza that could have  let more 
space for aid. To test whether different sizes of the fiscal imbalances have a different 
impact  on  aid  effort,  we  included  a  dummy  variable  meant  to  capture  a  situation 
where the fiscal imbalances reach a critical level. This dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 when a country has either a fiscal deficit or a public debt in excess of 3 and 60 
percent of GDP respectively, the limits set by the European Growth and Stability Pact. 
Two different specifications of such variable were introduced, the first referring only to 
signatory countries after 1997, the year in which the pact was signed, and the second 
covering  all  countries  and  all  years.  Still,  the  inclusion  of  this  variable,  in  the  two 
alternative specifications, does not completely solve the puzzle of the impact of the 
fiscal deficit: the estimated coefficient of the first specification of the dummy is not 
significant,  while  the  second  specification  is,  as  expected,  negative  but  highly 
significant  only  when  aid  effort  is  considered  gross  of  debt  relief  (Table  A1  in  the 
Appendix).  Public  debt:  as  expected,  a  high  debt  overhang  turns  out  to  have  a 
significant and negative effect on aid disbursement. Trade balance: the coefficient of 
this variable is always positive and significant, confirming the a priori supposition that 
foreign aid rises in the presence of a strong balance of payments in donor countries. 
Interestingly,  the  point  estimate  of  such  coefficient  is  roughly  constant  across  all 
specifications but (4) where it is strongly reduced, as the estimation was restricted to 
the 1980-2004 period. This seems to reasonably suggest that the foreign exchange 
constraint is less stringent in periods of free currency convertibility. Output gap: its 
coefficient is always positive, consistent with the expectation of a pro-cyclical pattern 
of foreign aid, and is statistically significant in all specifications. 
 
(iv) Institutional features: the estimated coefficient for the development agency is 
positive,  though  always  insignificant,  suggesting  that  an  independent  development 
agency does not produce a relevant level effect on aid effort. Still, this does not entail   30 
that  institutional  features  have  no  role  in  shaping  aid  effort,  as  the  interaction 
between development agency and output gap has a negative estimated coefficient, 
significant  in  all  specifications  and  close  in  size  to  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the 
output gap. This confirms the view that development agencies constitute a domestic 
lobby  able  to  defend  the  aid  budget  in  times  of  economic  slowdown.  Thus,  the 
existence of an independent development agency ensures greater aid stability over 
the economic cycle but not greater aid allocations 
22. Budgetary allocations are also 
estimated  to  have  a  relevant  degree  of  inertia,  as the  estimated  coefficient  of  the 
lagged aid effort is positive and highly significant in all specifications, confirming the 
findings of Faini (2006). Peer effect: the estimated effect is generally non-significant; 
this suggests that the marginal effect of the peer-pressure is ultimately not so strong, 
contrary  to  what  was  found  in  previous  analyses  (Round  and  Odedokun,  2004). 
Political  orientation:  surprisingly  enough,  the  estimated  effect  is  positive  and 
significant,  suggesting  that  a  conservative  government  raises  aid  effort.  A  similar 
result was obtained by Round and Odedokun (2004), who argue that “this could be 
due  to  the  fact  that  concern  for  the  poor  and  needy  –  attributed  to  left wing 
governments – is being overshadowed by other objectives in giving aid”
23 (Round and 
Odedokun, 2004; p. 307). In contrast, Faini (2006) finds that left-wing governments 
are associated with an increase in aid effort. Yet, his results are obtained making use 
of an index of political orientation ranging between 1 and 10; this suggests that the 
variable  used  in  this  paper  may  be  a  poor  measure  of  governments’  political 
orientation. 
 
(v) Alternative sources of foreign finance: because of its strong collinearity with 
real GDP per capita (r = 0.73), the stock of migrants on the resident population is 
included only in specification (9) that yields a positive but insignificant coefficient for 
this  variable.  Better  and  more  detailed  data  are  required  to  provide  a  sounder 
assessment of the relationship between migration and aid effort. 
 
Last but not  least, as aid effort  is defined as disbursements net of debt relief, we 
included  this  latter  variable  in  the  set  of  regressors,  to  test  the  relevance  of  the 
                                                 
22 The relevance of this result needs not to be understated, as avoiding boom and burst cycles in foreign 
aid is likely to significantly reduce its possible Dutch Disease effects as well disruptions in service delivery 
in recipient countries. 
23 However, caution should be used when judging these results, since the dataset we used - the World 
Bank's Database of Political Institutions – classifies some government in a debatable way, e.g. the Italian 
government led by Prodi between 1996 and 1998 is identified as ‘centrist’ while, in fact, it was a center-
left government, probably no more ‘moderate’ than a US Democratic Government.   31 
argument that claims that debt cancellations have a detrimental impact on the actual 
transfer of resources towards recipient countries, so that they would not represent an 
additional effort by donor countries. The estimated coefficient of debt relief, defined as 
a share of donor countries’ GDP, is negative and highly statistically and economically 
significant. The estimations suggest that once a donor country writes off a $1,000 
debt,  it  reduces  its  disbursements  by  approximately  $700,  casting  doubts  on  the 
actual development impact of debt relief programs. 
 
The  checks  on  the  robustness  of  the  estimated  parameters  confirm  that  they  are 
broadly stable even when restricting the estimation of the aid effort relation to the 
1980-2004  period  (specification  4)  and  to  the  current  members  of  the  EU 
(specification 5). This helped reducing the concerns about the poolability data from 
many countries and years arising from the results of the Chow test.
24 
Among the 12 specifications presented in Table 11, the first two were selected as the 
preferred  ones.  Although  the  Hausman  specification  test  does  not  reject  the  null 
hypothesis that the random effect estimator is consistent and efficient, it was decided 
to rely on specification (1) rather than (2) to assess the extent and evolution over 
time  of  the  Italian  aid  gap  (see  Section  5),  excluding  in  such  specification  the 
country-fixed effect ai from the theoretical level of aid that is used to estimate aid gap, 
as the ai do not appear to be correlated with the regressors. In any case, as can be 
inferred by the strong similarity of the parameters of specifications (1) and (2), the 
size and time-profile of the Italian aid gap is insensitive to this choice.  
 
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE ITALIAN AID PERFORMANCE AND OF THE ‘ITALIAN AID GAP’ 
 
Though always weak, Italy’s aid effort has fluctuated perceptibly over the last forty 
years. In the 1960s and 1970s Italy was part of a group of comparatively less affluent 
OECD nations (including the other Southern European countries, Ireland, Finland as 
well as Austria and Switzerland) that allocated a negligible 0.10-0.15 percent of their 
GDP to aid. During this period, the main political parties did not show interest for the 
aid  issue,  and  the  Italian  development  assistance  was  mainly  entrusted  to  a  small 
group  of  NGOs  providing  technical  assistance  and  training  to  a  few  low  income 
                                                 
24 As a further robustness  check, we estimated specification (1) in first differences, i.e. including the 
change  in  aid  effort  with  respect  to  the  previous  year  as  the  dependent  variable,  and  excluding  the 
lagged value of aid from the set of regressors. Once again, the results – that are available from the 
authors upon request – signal that the estimated parameters are remarkably robust.   32 
countries (Isernia, 1997). Confirmation of such neglect is given by the fact that the 
first Italian law on development cooperation was approved only in 1979.  
Aid volumes grew during the 1980s following an active campaign spearheaded since 
1980 by the Radical Party on occasion of the International Year of the Child. The aid 
issue  was  later  taken  up  by  the  Socialist  Party  that  saw  in  it  an  opportunity  to 
strengthen its position within the Italian political system. As result, the aid to GDP 
ratio rose from around 0.2 percent of GDP in 1983 to over 0.4 percent in 1988. Yet, 
such increase was not accompanied by a clear identification of the priority countries 
and sectors of intervention, or of the strategic mission to be assigned to aid policy. 
Meanwhile the aid apparatus remained weak and at the whims of the political class, 
and no investment was made to create the technical expertise needed for an effective 
allocation  and  timely  disbursement  of  an  increasing  amount  of  aid  funds  (Isernia, 
1997; ActionAid, 2007). The rising aid trend was reversed from 1990 onward and by 
the early 2000s the aid to GDP ratio had returned to its historical low level of 0.15-
0.20, without changing significantly since then.  
The poor Italian aid performance of the last 15 years coincided with the adoption of a 
restrictive fiscal stance (needed to satisfy the Maastricht criteria), the disintegration of 
the Soviet Bloc, the end of the Cold War and the related need to prop up friendly 
regimes  in  developing  countries,  a  rapid  increase  in  trade,  migration  and  financial 
links  with  the  developing  countries,  9/11,  and  a  major  slowdown  of  the  Italian 
economy  in  the  first  half  of  the  2000s.  During  this  period,  aid  performance 
deteriorated  also  in  several  other  industrialized  countries  such  as  the  US,  Canada, 
Germany and France, though it improved in several others. 
In view of all this, it has been argued that Italy’s poor performance has to be seen in 
the context of such trends, of the country’s limited colonial experience, of its chronic 
high-deficit, high-debt situation and of other adverse factors. To further justify the low 
level of Italian aid, it has been claimed that the country promotes the development of 
poorer nations in other ways, e.g. via a capillary network of Italian religious and lay 
NGOs operating in the developing countries, by opening its borders to a large number 
of migrants (though such opening has been proportionately more pronounced in other 
‘laggard  countries’  such  as  Spain,  Greece  and  Portugal),  by  providing  the  fourth 
largest  contingent  of  UN  peacekeepers,  by  intensifying  trade  relations  with  the 
developing countries, and by generous debt cancellations. 
How correct are these claims? Are there Italian ‘special conditions’ that justify the low 
level and quality of Italian aid? Or are these claims being made in an instrumental   33 
way? To what extent can these ‘special conditions’ explain the low level of Italian aid ? 
Would the Italian aid performance approach the DAC ‘aid giving norm’ if these and 
other factors were taken into account when measuring what the Italian aid should be 
once considering the country’s contextual situation? This section aims at answering 
these queries. In particular it aims at answering the following three questions: once 
Italy’s contextual conditions are taken into account, does the Italian aid performance 
fall within the DAC ‘norm’? In case it is below it, how large is the Italian ‘aid gap’? And, 
has this gap widened or narrowed over time?  
To answer these questions and offer an estimate of the ‘Italian aid gap’, we compare 
the level of the Italian public aid with different aid targets and aid behaviors. The first 
‘normative’ benchmarks against which to assess the Italian aid performance are the 
long-standing UN aid target of 0.7 percent of the donors’ GDP and the 2002 EU target 
that established that by 2006 at least 0.33 percent of the GDP of its members was to 
be assigned to development aid. It is well known that Italian aid has remained well 
below such targets and that the Italian aid gap in relation to them remains substantial 
(Table  12).  Indeed,  while  most  donors  failed  to  reach  the  UN  target,  most  of  the 
EU-15  countries  reached  the  2002  EU  target,  with  the  exception  of  Italy,  Greece, 
Portugal and Spain (OECD, 2007a). As a third normative benchmark to assess the 
Italian aid gap we choose the average level of aid over GDP granted by the European 
countries. Also in this case, the Italian aid gap is substantial, except for the years 
1985-89. In 2000-4 it was equal to 0.294 percent of GDP (Table 12). 
Yet, these three normative gaps do not take into account Italy’s specific conditions, 
such  as  the  disadvantage  caused  by  a  large  public  debt  or  the  absence  of  an 
independent aid agency.  
 
Table 12. Alternative normative measures of the Italian aid gap 
 
  percent of GDP  
Aid gap with respect to:  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
United Nations Goal
a  -  -  -  -  -  0.521  0.515 
European Council of Barcelona
a  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.145 
European average
b  0.196  0.297  0.205  0.073  0.170  0.250  0.294 
  percent of actual net disbursements 
Aid gap with respect to:  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
United Nations Goal
a  -  -  -  -  -  291.4  279.1 
European Council of Barcelona
a  -  -  -  -  -  -  78.7 
European average
b  164.7  311.3  103.2  20.4  52.6  139.8  159.3 
 
Notes: 
a aid including debt relief, 
b aid excluding debt relief. 
 
Source: authors’ calculations.   34 
 
To take these structural, institutional and macroeconomic conditions into account we 
estimated a ‘positive’ (or behavioral) aid gap that assumes that a country’s aid giving 
behavior  is  described  by  the  parameters  of  the  multivariate  econometric  analysis 
which represent, it must be reminded, the average aid giving behavior of the 22 DAC 
countries over the 1970-2004 period. Before proceeding to the measurement of the 
estimated Italian aid gap, it is worthwhile to underscore that our multivariate analysis 
does not suggest a well-defined relationship between the aid to GDP ratio and the ‘aid 
gap’, that is to say that countries with a high (low) level of aid giving need not to be 
characterized  by  a  negative  (positive)  aid  gap.  To  stress  this  point,  Figure  1  plots 
together the level of aid and the aid gap estimated from specification (1) in Table 11, 
including the country-fixed effect ai in the definition of the aid gap. Figure 1 shows 
that although the relationship between the aid effort and aid gap is negative, there is 
a significant amount of variability around the mean, implying that also some countries 
with a fairly high aid effort exhibit a positive aid gap. 
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Yet, as some of the special difficulties faced by Italy depend on past policy mistakes 
(as in the case of an excessive accumulation of public debt, or inability to create an 
independent aid agency) the aid gap estimated from the multivariate analysis is likely 
to provide an unfair justification for Italy’s poor aid performance. For instance, if a 
country has a large public debt, specification (1) generates a fairly low value for the 
warranted  aid  and  thus  for  the  aid  gap.  This  objection  suggests  that  we  should   35 
calculate a second warranted level of foreign aid that does not account for the impact 
of  negative  circumstances  that  are  –  at  least  in  part  –  the  result  of  ‘bad  policies’ 
followed in the past. A country’s past or present policy mistakes – in other words – 
cannot be used as a convincing argument to reduce current aid allocations. Following 
this line of reasoning, we calculated two alternative levels of warranted aid: the first 
excludes  the  depressing  effect  on  aid  giving  due  to  large  fiscal  imbalances,  by 
assuming  a  zero  primary  fiscal  balance  (when  this  is  actually  negative),  and  a  60 
percent debt to GDP ratio (when its actual value is above this threshold). The second 
level of warranted aid adds to this scenario an institutional change, by assuming the 
existence of an Italian autonomous aid agency. 
The estimated parameters of specification (1) are thus used as a basis to compute the 
values of the warranted Italian aid effort, i.e. the values that aid effort should take 
when  inserting  on  the  right-hand  side  of  aid  equation  [1]  the  values  that  the 
explanatory  variables  take  in  the  case  of  Italy  –  eventually  adjusted  as  indicated 
above, so as to avoid to calculate a low value of warranted aid due to past mistakes. 
If  the  warranted  aid  effort  arrived  at  in  this  manner  is  higher  than  that  actually 
provided, Italy would be underperforming in relation to the what would be expected 
on the basis of the average DAC behavior. The difference between these two values 
represents a further and more robust yearly measure of the Italian ‘aid gap’. The gap 
is likely to have fallen during the 1980s when Italian aid surged and to have risen 
between then and the present time. A comparison between the aid that Italy should 
have provided if it behaved as the average DAC countries and that it actually provided 
allows  to  conclude  –  after  taking  into  accounts  all  factors  discussed  above  which 
influence the aid to GDP ratio in donors countries – whether Italy performs according 
to the DAC norm, below it or above it. 
The positive measure of the Italian ‘aid gap’ computed on the basis of the multivariate 
analysis  is  lower  than  the  prior  ‘normative’  measures  of  the  aid  gap,  signaling 
therefore that the Italian aid performance with respect to the DAC average can be 
explained to some extent by the structural problems faced by the Italian economy 
such  as  a  massive  debt  overhang  and  other  factors.  Yet,  the  estimated  aid  gap 
remains nevertheless far from being negligible even when all the Italian problems are 
accounted for; more specifically, the estimated yearly aid gap has been amounting to 
approximately 0.1 percent of the Italian GDP since 1995. 
   36 
Table 13. Alternative positive measures of the Italian aid gap 
 
  percent of GDP  
Definition of aid gap  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Estimated on specification (1)   0.059  0.083  0.040  -0.002  0.048  0.097  0.096 
Estimated on specification (1), 
assuming fiscal balance
a  
0.058  0.078  0.043  0.035  0.123  0.214  0.183 
Estimated on specification (1), 
assuming fiscal balance and 
institutional changes
b 
0.062  0.094  0.064  0.055  0.143  0.234  0.185 
  percent of actual net disbursements 
Definition of aid gap  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Estimated on specification (1)  49.6  86.7  20.2  -0.6  15.2  57.3  59.4 
Estimated on specification (1), 
assuming fiscal balance
a  48.3  81.5  21.7  9.7  39.0  126.6  113.5 
Estimated on specification (1), 
assuming fiscal balance and 
institutional changes
b 
52.4  98.4  32.0  15.4  45.4  138.0  114.9 
 
Notes:
 a aid gap computed under the assumption that the primary fiscal balance is equal to zero when it is 
actually negative and that the public debt to GDP ratio is equal to 60 percent when the actual ratio is above 
this  threshold; 
b  aid  gap    computed  under  the  assumptions  described  in  the  previous  note,  and  further 
assuming the existence of an independent aid agency. 
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of the Italian aid gap from 1971 to 2004, together with its 
corresponding  95  percent  confidence  interval:  the  aid  gap  has  always  been 
significantly positive since the early 1990s,
25 while it had been either negative or non 
significant since 1984 to 1990.
26  
 




























                                                 
25 In only 3 years the aid gap is significant at the 10 rather than the 5 percent confidence level.  
26 This  happened  notwithstanding  the  substantial  and  rising  divergence  between  commitments  and 
disbursement that Italy recorded during the 1980s (see Table 2).    37 
The extent of the current Italian aid gap emerges even more clearly from the lower 
panel of Table 13, where the positive aid gap is measured as a share of current net 
disbursements. According to the estimates obtained in this way, the Italian aid gap 
exceeded 50 percent of net disbursements over the 1995-2004 period. That is to say 
that,  even  when  controlling  for  its  underlying  economic  problems,  Italy  has 
underperformed markedly with respect to the DAC average, and Italy’s disbursements 
should be increased by roughly half of their actual level to be in line with the aid level 
predicted by its economic, structural and institutional conditions. 
As expected, the other two positive aid gaps (assuming a balanced primary deficit, a 
public debt over GDP ratio equal to 60 percent, and – in the second case – also the 
existence  of  an  independent  state  aid  agency)  are  larger  in  size,  suggesting  that 
Italy’s large fiscal imbalances have a large negative effect on the Italian aid effort, 
while the absence of an independent aid agency would not widen the aid gap in all 
years, except during years of recession, as – for instance – in the early-mid 1990s 
and the mid 2000s. Figure 3 describes the evolution of the three alternative values of 
aid gap derived from the multivariate analysis. 
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Table 14 quantifies the monetary value of the Italian aid gap in 2006-7, assuming that 
the average gap over 2000-04 remained constant as a percent of GDP over 2006 and 
2007.  To  meet  the  UN  0.7  percent  target,  in  2006  the  government  should  have 
assigned to aid an additional €7.6 billion. Even the more modest aid target set in 2002   38 
in Barcelona would require an additional allocation of over €2 billion, while to reach 
average current European aid effort Italy would need to raise its development aid by 
€4.3 billion. Finally, the volume of the aid gap measured by means of the positive 
multivariate  regression  specification  (1)  taking  into  account  the  country’s 
circumstances is over € 1.4 billion, while if we assume also fiscal stability and the 
existence of an independent aid agency the gap becomes much higher, i.e. over €2.7 
and €2.8 billion respectively
27.  
 
Table 14. Estimates of the volume of the aid gaps, € millions  
 
 Aid gap in relation to:  2006  2007  
United Nations Goal  7,603.4  7,906.3 
European Council of Barcelona  2,144.4  2,229.8 
European average  4,339.6  4,512.7 
Specification (1)   1,413.7  1,470.0 
Specification (1), assuming fiscal balance   2,699.9  2,807.6 
Specification (1), assuming fiscal balance 
and institutional changes 
2,729.5  2,838.3 
 
Source: authors’ calculations, based on GDP estimates for 2007 from Eurostat 
 
Finally,  it  is  interesting  to  compare  the  Italian  aid  gap  with  that  of  other  DAC 
members with a poor record of aid giving. The OECD (2007b) indicates that, besides 
Italy, other three Southern European countries – Greece, Portugal and Spain
28 – did 
not  meet  in  2006  the  minimum  country  target  set  by  the  EU  during  its  Barcelona 
Council.  These  countries  represent  a  natural  reference  group  to  provide  a  further 
assessment of the Italian aid effort between 1995 and 2004, a period characterized by 
a significantly positive Italian aid gap (Figure 2). In this regard, Figures 4a-4c show 
that  the  aid  gap  of  these  three  countries  followed  different  paths  over  the  period. 
Greece recorded a negative – albeit non significant – aid gap for most of the years, 
Spain shows a positive but downward-trending aid gap, while the picture for Portugal 
resembles the Italian one, as the gap is positive for 7 out of 10 years, although Figure 
4b evidences that the Portuguese aid gap turned negative in 2004, as the country 
markedly improved its aid effort. Spain and – to an even greater extent – Greece fare 
relatively well in comparison with the average DAC behavior, while Italy does not; the 
                                                 
27 The computation of the two normative aid gap would be more properly carried out in a full-blown 
simulation model. 
28 OECD  (2007b)  signals  that  Spain  missed  the  Barcelona  target  only  because  of  a  change  in  GNI 
accounting.   39 
limited aid effort of these three countries appears in fact to be mostly due to their 
adverse structural and macroeconomic conditions, which appear to be relevant factors 
in explaining why their aid performances did not live up to European commitments. 
Thus,  the  comparison  with  the  other  Southern  European  DAC  member  countries 
reinforces the evidence about the extreme weakness of the Italian aid performance 
since the early 1990s. 
 
Figure 4a. Greek aid gap,  


























Figure 4c. Spanish aid gap, 


























Figure 4b. Portuguese aid gap, 





























This paper has argued that Italy’s aid performance is problematic in more than one 
respect.  To  start  with,  the  country’s  aid  volume  is  low  in  relation  to  whatever 
normative  or  positive  benchmark  is  utilized,  and  a  minimum  of  €1.4-2.8  billion  is 
required to reach the aid level warranted by its specific macroeconomic, structural and 
institutional conditions. Its performance is weak not only in relation to the average 
DAC behavior, but also to that of other less prosperous Southern European countries. 
In addition, the level of arrears (signaling a weak aid administration), though falling in 
relation to the past, remains high. This paper also shows that the Italian aid gap –   40 
relative to an unimpressive DAC average behavior – persists even when accounting 
for the country’s unfavorable conditions (and, in some cases, one wonders whether 
these  are  justifiable),  regardless  of  the  political  orientation  of  the  various 
governments that succeeded themselves at the helm of the country. The achievement 
of international targets is becoming more and more distant over time – and reaching 
these  objectives,  to  which  now  the  main  European  partners  of  Italy  are  firmly 
committed, will require a large budgetary effort. It is time the country respects the 
international  obligations  it  has  underwritten  and  starts  playing  also  in  the  field  of 
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Table A1. Determinants of aid effort, aid including debt relief 
  Dependent variable: aid over GDP 
Variables                   Model Specification 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Lagged aid, countries with non stationary 
series 
0.622                
(11.92)*** 
0.543                
(13.38)*** 
-  0.717               
(14.23)*** 
0.659                
(12.74)*** 
0.622                
(11.87)*** 
0.613                
(11.70)*** 
0.622                
(9.42)*** 
0.619                
(11.78)*** 
0.615                
(11.70)*** 
0.623                
(12.03)*** 
0.602                
(11.21)*** 
Debt cancellation
a  0.152                
(0.97) 
0.140              
(0.84) 
0.219                
(1.33) 
0.211                
(0.95) 
0.113               
(0.67) 
0.152                
(0.97) 
0.181                
(1.11) 
-0.030                
(-0.25) 
0.161                
(1.01) 
0.136                
(0.85) 
0.162                
(1.03) 
0.142                
(0.95) 
Real per capita income, ln  0.031               
(1.29) 
0.021               
(0.87) 
0.008                
(0.30) 
0.007               
(0.29) 
0.055               
(1.93)* 
0.031               
(1.31) 
0.039               
(1.62) 
0.246              
(4.43)*** 
0.005              
(0.15) 
0.036              
(1.51) 
0.038              
(1.57) 




0.005             
(3.56)*** 
0.006             
(4.65)*** 
0.010             
(6.84)*** 
-0.000             
(-0.34) 
0.002             
(1.74)* 
0.005             
(3.54)*** 
0.005             
(3.52)*** 
0.003         
(2.00)** 
0.005             
(3.57)*** 
0.005             
(3.42)*** 
0.005             
(3.38)*** 




0.014                   
(6.42)*** 
0.015                   
(9.35)*** 
0.021                   
(10.30)*** 
0.004                   
(2.81)*** 
0.012                   
(6.34)*** 
0.014                   
(6.39)*** 
0.014                   
(6.49)*** 
0.009                   
(4.17)*** 
0.014                   
(6.41)*** 
0.013                   
(6.43)*** 
0.014                   
(6.41)*** 
0.013                   
(6.23)*** 
Public debt
a  -0.002              
(-6.54)*** 
-0.002              
(-7.40)*** 
-0.002              
(-8.22)*** 
-0.001              
(-4.29)*** 
-0.001              
(-5.74)*** 
-0.002              
(-6.51)*** 
-0.002            
(-6.40)*** 
-0.002              
(-6.34)*** 
-0.002              
(-6.60)*** 
-0.002              
(-6.29)*** 
-0.002              
(-6.41)*** 




0.010          
(5.27)*** 
0.011          
(6.42)*** 
0.014        
(8.41)*** 
0.004          
(3.37)*** 
0.008          
(4.49)*** 
0.010          
(5.32)*** 
0.010          
(5.11)*** 
0.009          
(4.40)*** 
0.011          
(5.28)*** 
0.010          
(5.35)*** 
0.010          
(5.23)*** 
0.010          
(5.19)*** 
Development Agency  0.010                
(0.57) 
0.022                
(1.36) 
0.025                
(1.31) 
0.016                
(0.84) 
0.002                
(0.09) 
0.010                
(0.57) 
0.006                
(0.34) 
0.012                
(0.76) 
0.013                
(0.71) 
0.010                
(0.57) 
0.009                
(0.49) 
0.007                
(0.40) 
Output gap
a  0.008            
(3.85)*** 
0.009            
(4.04)*** 
0.010            
(3.91)*** 
0.004            
(2.37)** 
0.008            
(3.96)*** 
0.008            
(3.81)*** 
0.008            
(3.86)*** 
0.005            
(1.96)* 
0.009            
(3.88)*** 
0.009            
(3.91)*** 
0.008            
(3.76)*** 
0.007            
(3.16)*** 
Output gap*Dev. Ag.  -0.008                
(-2.68)*** 
-0.008                
(-2.52)** 
-0.007                
(-2.15)** 
-0.009                
(-3.76)*** 
-0.013                
(-3.18)*** 
-0.008                
(-2.67)*** 
-0.009                
(-2.78)*** 
-0.006                
(-1.97)** 
-0.008                
(-2.52)** 
-0.008                
(-2.67)*** 
-0.008                
(-2.60)** 
-0.008                
(-2.58)** 
Peer effect
c   -0.039                
(-0.45) 
-0.067                
(-0.75) 
0.056                
(0.49) 
0.003                
(0.03) 
0.039                
(-0.39) 
-0.039                
(-0.45) 
-0.072                
(-0.82) 
-0.192                
(-1.84)* 
-0.029                
(-0.33) 
-0.041                
(-0.48) 
-0.025                
(-0.29) 
-0.010                
(-0.12) 
Violation of the G&SP  -  -  -  -  -  0.001                
(0.06)  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Violation of the G&SP, all   -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.036                
(-2.61)*** 
-  -  -  -  - 
Gini coefficient  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.010                
(-4.09)*** 
-  -  -  - 
Migrants  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.004                
(1.47)  -  -  - 
Political orientation  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.007                
(1.95)* 
-  - 
Population in poor former  colonies, ln   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.017                
(-1.76)* 
- 
Population, ln  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.321                
(-3.90)*** 
Countries, obs.  22, 558  22, 558  22, 560  22, 464  15, 370  22, 558  22, 558  20, 386  22, 558  22, 558  22, 558  22, 558 
Overall R
2  0.555  0.611  0.632  0.343  0.663  0.555  0.565  0.504  0.543  0.563  0.461  0.408 
Estimator  FE  RE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  RE  RE 
F-test with FE, Breusch-Pagan LM test 
with RE 
75.51                    
(0.00) 
2936.27                   
(0.00) 
63.11                    
(0.00) 
104.26                    
(0.00) 
57.83                    
(0.00) 
75.28                    
(0.00) 
73.38                    
(0.00) 
65.68                   
(0.00) 
68.02                    
(0.00) 
67.94                    
(0.00) 
75.54                    
(0.00) 
78.77                   
(0.00) 
Hausman test (p-value)  -6.34                                     
(-) 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
Notes: t-statistics within parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level respectively; the set of regressors also contains a constant term; 
a  signals that the regressor is expressed as a 
ratio to GDP. 
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